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I 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents incorporate here, as their Statement of Facts, 
the Findings of Fact entered by the trial court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court adjudicated the conflicting claims of the 
parties and quieted title to the subject property in the parties 
based upon the strength of the showing made by each party as to 
its title. The evidence demonstrates, and the trial court found, 
that no party proved simultaneous possession and payment of taxes 
on any parcel for the requisite period to perfect adverse pos-
session. The evidence demonstrates and the Court found that a 
1940 tax deed in favor of Robert and Gilbert Kimball, as amended 
by a 1976 quit claim deed, constituted the only valid root of 
title to the subject property, and quieted title in the 
successors of Robert and Gilbert Kimball and partitioned the 
property pursuant to the prayer of the Respondents. 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree are 
amply supported by the record and accurately constitute the 
judgment of the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY QUIETED TITLE IN THE PARTIES 
BASED UPON THE STRENGTH OF EACH PARTY'S CLAIM OF INTEREST 
The fundamental rule in a quiet title action is that each 
Claimant must prevail on the strength of its own title and not on 
the weakness of its adversary's title. Babcock v. Dangerfield, 
94 P2d. 862 (Utah, 1939) , Homeowners Loan Corporation v. Dudley, 
141 P2d. 160 (Utah, 1943), Mercur Coalition Mining Co. v. Cannon, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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184 P2d. 341 (Utah, 1947), Colman v. Butkovich, 538 P.2d. 188 
(Utah, 1975), Ash v. State, 572 P.2d. 1374 (Utah, 1977), Church 
v. Meadow Springs Ranch Corporation, Inc., 659 P.2d. 1049 (Utah, 
1983). Further, the court in a quiet title action must not enter 
a partial or incomplete decree, but must decide all issues in the 
controversy before it so as to afford complete relief. Fisher v. 
Davis, 291 P.493 (Utah, 1930), Floor v. Johnson. 199 P.2d 547 
(Utah, 1948), Helman v. Patterson, 241 P.2d. 910 (Utah, 1952). 
To do otherwise would be to leave property vested in no one or to 
invite further litigation. The Court should define the interests 
of the parties before it in and to the property which is the 
subject of the quiet title action. Stearns Ranches Co. v. 
Archison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 96 Cal Rptr. Fisher v. 
Davis, supra. 
After hearing the evidence, viewing the exhibits and con-
cluding the trial of the matter, the trial court confirmed the 
property interests of the parties before the Court on appeal as 
set forth in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree, 
based upon the strength of the showing each party made as to its 
claim of title. In its addendum at page 1, the Respondent has 
set forth a schematic diagram showing the title claimed by each 
party to the quiet title action, and the decree of the Court as 
to each party's interest. 
Maud and Gilbert Kimball claimed sole ownership of all of 
the parcel here in dispute. The claim of Gilbert and Maud 
Kimball was based upon a 1940 tax deed to Robert Kimball and 
Gilbert Kimball. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, p. 91). Upon execution Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
< 
and delivery of the 1940 tax deed, title became vested in Gilbert 
Kimball and Robert Kimball as tenants in common, and there 
neither appeared of record nor was there before the Court any 
subsequent conveyance of Robert's interest predating his death in 
1976. In 1976 Gilbert Kimball recorded a quit claim deed which 
provided a metes and bounds description of the parcel intended to 
be conveyed by the 1940 tax deed. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, p. 101, 
Deposition of Gilbert Kimball, p. 41, 42, 53 and 54). The deed's 
description was constructed from the descriptions of adjacent 
parcels conveyed by the Kimballs over the years, with the remain-
ing parcel constituting the corrected description of the tax 
deeded parcel. (T. 55, 56, 57). The deed operated to convey to 
Gilbert and Maud Kimball, as joint tenants and not as tenants in 
common, the co-tenancy interest of Gilbert Kimball in the subject 
parcel. An error in the 1976 Quit Claim Deed was corrected by 
the filing of a corrected quit claim deed in 1977 (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 4, p. 102). 
During the course of the proceedings, Gilbert Kimball passed 
away. (R. 117, 118) By operation of law, the interest of Gilbert 
Kimball as a joint tenant in the cotenancy interest passed to 
Maud Kimball. 
Robert Kimball's co-tenancy interest passed to Elizabeth 
Kimball by heirship pursuant to the Will of Robert Kimball and 
the provisions of the Will and Decree of Distribution, which 
provided for the distribution of all property not specifically 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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described therein to Elizabeth Kimball as the sole heir of Robert 
Kimball. (R. 129-131, Defendant's Exhibit F-19) 
During the course of the proceedings and after the publica-
tion of service of summons upon all parties, Elizabeth Kimball 
quit-claimed her 50% cotenancy interest to Melvin and Peggy 
Fletcher. (Defendant's Exhibit F-17) Thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. 
Fletcher amended their pleadings to crossclaim and counterclaim 
against Maud Kimball and the Sweeney Land Company, praying for 
partition of the subject parcel as set forth more specifically in 
the crossclaim and counterclaim. (R. 177-180) Subsequently, but 
also during the course of the proceedings, Mr. and Mrs. Fletcher 
quit-claimed to Sweeney Land Company all of their co-tenancy 
interest in the disputed parcel north of the centerline of the 
30-foot strip. (R. 322-330). 
Sweeney Land Company claimed title to a 30-foot strip of the 
subject property through mesne conveyances beginning with a deed 
from George A. Snyder to Park City Smelting Co. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 4, p. 4%). Neither that deed, nor any subsequent convey-
ances under which Sweeney's predecessors claim, contains an 
ascertainable description, due to the failure of each deed to 
describe the easterly boundary of the 30-foot strip. Due to the 
indeterminate description of the deeds under which Sweeney claims 
ownership, the Court determined that the only root of title for 
the Sweeney Land Company at the time of trial was the deed to it 
from Melvin and Peggy Fletcher, which conveyed to Sweeney Land 
Company the 50% cotenancy interest originally owned by Robert 
Kimball in all the disputed parcel lying north of the centerline Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the 30-foot strip. The land so conveyed included all of the 
Herschiser parcel and all other land north of the centerline of 
the 30-foot strip claimed by Sweeney Land Company in its com-
plaint. (Parcels 1 and 2 as shown on page 1 of the addendum 
hereto). 
The Court evaluated the claims of the parties based upon the 
root of title of each party and the strength of each party's 
title. The Court found that no party had responded to the 
service by publication of summons and therefore any parties who 
may have been entitled to represent the interest of Ed Herschiser 
in the Herschiser parcel were not before the Court and were 
therefore in default. (T. 18, 19) Upon proof by the Fletchers 
and Kimballs that the 1976 Quit Claim Deed accurately described 
the property intended to be conveyed by the 1940 tax deed, 
(Deposition of Gilbert Kimball, p. 41, 42, 53, and 54) the Court 
found that the 1940 tax deed constituted a valid root of title 
for Gilbert and Robert Kimball and their successors to the 
subject parcel. (Finding of Fact, No. 8) The Court found that 
Melvin and Peggy Fletcher had acquired by deed the interest of 
Elizabeth Kimball, who had succeeded by testacy to the 50% 
cotenancy interest of Robert Kimball. 
Although Sweeney Land Company claimed to have paid taxes on 
the 30-foot strip, the Court found that possession by Melvin and 
Peggy Fletcher of the 30-foot strip and the Herschiser parcel 
effectively prevented any other party from acquiring title to 
those parcels by adverse possession. (Transcript of Courtfs 
Ruling, p. 4) Neither Sweeney Land Company nor Kimballs contest Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that finding here. Since no party other than Fletchers could 
show possession, the Court determined that, notwithstanding 
claims of payment of taxes by Sweeney and Kimballs, no party 
could gain ownership by adverse possession and that the only 
theories upon which any party could prevail were the theories of 
conveyance by deed or by operation of law. 
The Kimballs claimed to have extinguished the co-tenancy 
interest of Robert Kimball by adverse possession. The burden of 
proving adverse possession against a co-tenant is formidable and 
requires proof of conduct of the most open and notorious nature 
placing the co-tenant on notice of the disavowal of the cotenancy 
and the intended adverse possession. Olwell v. Clark, 658, P.2d. 
585 (Utah, 1982) . Kimballs rely solely on their payment of taxes 
on the property and failed to present any evidence of intended 
adverse possession or of conduct sufficient to put Robert Kimball 
on notice that they intended to take any action adverse to the 
interest of Robert Kimball. (Finding of Fact, No. 14) The 
evidence presented by the Kimballs in support of their claim of 
extinguishment of Robert's interest was the testimony of Maud 
Kimball (R. 148, 149) and the deposition of Gilbert Kimball (p. 
52) that Gilbert believed that he had failed to pay the taxes for 
a period of years after acquiring the parcel pursuant to the 1940 
tax deed, and that he had reacquired the parcel by tax sale in 
his name only from Summit County, thereby foreclosing any claims 
by or through Robert. It is doubtful that, even had such an 
action occurred, Gilbert would have successfully extinguished 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Robert's interest given the holding of Olwell, supra, and the 
cases cited therein. 
In this case, the Court found, after examining the tax 
rolls, that the property had failed to go to tax sale as de-
scribed by Gilbert, and that title to the property therefore 
remained vested in Gilbert and Robert as co-tenants pursuant to 
the 1940 tax deed, and in their heirs and successors in interest. 
POINT II 
SWEENEY LAND COMPANY DID NOT MEET ITS BURDEN 
OF PROOF TO DEMONSTRATE TITLE TO THE 30-STRIP. 
Sweeney Land Company claims ownership of a 30-foot strip of 
land pursuant to a series of conveyances beginning in 1883. 
Nowhere in Sweeney's claimed chain of title, however, is the 
eastern terminus of the 30-foot strip described. There are 
references to a "30-foot by 90 foot strip" (T. 87, 88) and a 
strip extending to the "middle of the block" (T. 89), but there 
exists no description of an eastern terminus of the 30-foot strip 
in Sweeney's chain of title until Sweeney Land Company had 
prepared a survey of the 30-foot strip showing it to extend from 
Park Avenue to Pacific Avenue, a distance of 160.96 feet (T. 88). 
To conflict with the property the subject of this appeal, the 
30-foot strip would have to extend east farther that 99 feet from 
Park Avenue. (T. 89) 
The evidence showed, and the Court expressly found, that the 
claimed root of title of Sweeney Land Company to the portion of 
the 30-foot strip in controversy was an 1892 deed from the Snyder 
Estate to Edmund Thiriot, which described the land by reference 
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to another deed dated November 13, 1883, in favor of Pobert C. 
Chambers. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, p. 13%, Finding of Fact, No.7). 
The 1883 deed is missing, not of record and was not in evidence. 
Subsequent deeds to Sweeney's predecessors also refer to the 1883 
deed for the description of the 30-foot strip claimed by Sweeney 
Land Company. 
A deed which does not sufficiently describe boundaries to 
render them capable of reasonable ascertainment does not convey 
any interest, (Howard v. Howard, 367 P.2d. 193 (Utah, 1962)) and 
is a nullity. The Court held that the open-ended description of 
the 30-foot strip rendered the conveyances in Sweeney's chain of 
title insufficient to vest the Sweeney Land Company with title to 
the property it claimed. Sweeney's own expert testified that the 
eastern boundary of the 30-foot strip was described based upon 
his "best judgment" rather than upon any objectively ascertain-
able description (T. 48, 49). 
The brief of Sweeney Land Company erroneously asserts that 
the claim of the Kimballs (and thus the Fletchers) to the 30-foot 
strip is by adverse possession. That is simply not the case. 
Kimballs1 and Fletchers' title is pursuant to the 1940 tax deed 
as a amended by the 1976 quit claim deed. As indicated above, no 
party to this action was able to show coincident possession and 
payment of taxes, and the Decree of Quiet Title is therefore 
based upon title by deed and by operation of law, not upon 
adverse possession. 
Because of the failure of Sweeney Land Company to prove its 
own title to the 30-foot strip by deed, the Court found that the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
only valid source of title of Sweeney Land Company to the subject 
property was the quit-claim deed from Melvin and Peggy Fletcher, 
conveying the 50% co-tenancy interest received from Elizabeth 
Kimball, rooted in the 1940 tax deed to Robert and Gilbert 
Kimball, 
POINT III 
THE COURT HEARD THE OBJECTIONS OF THE APPELLANTS 
TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND DECREE 
ON TWO OCCASIONS, OVERRULED THE OBJECTIONS AND 
EXPRESSLY FOUND THAT ITS RULING WAS ACCURATELY 
SET FORTH IN THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND DECREE. 
The Court issued a verbal ruling from the bench the day 
after the trial concluded and requested that the counsel for the 
Fletchers prepare Findings, Conclusions and Decree accordingly. 
(Transcript of the Court's Ruling). Counsel thereafter undertook 
the task of preparing the Findings, Conclusions and Decree which 
are before the Court on a appeal. The proposed Findings, Con-
clusions and Decree were delivered to the Appellants and they 
filed a timely objections. The Court heard the objections of the 
Appellants and overruled them, stating that the Findings, Con-
clusions and Decree accurately represented the intent of the 
Court's ruling and were consistent with the Court's ruling. The 
Court also denied the Kimball's Motion for a new trial. Neither 
Appellant prepared or submitted alternative Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law or a proposed Decree of Quiet Title for 
consideration by the Court. The Appellants objected once again 
to the Findings, Conclusions and Decree and a further hearing was 
held by the Court. After the final hearing by the Court, the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Court executed the Findings, Conclusions and Decree, overruled 
the objections and denied the motion for new trial. 
The Appellants argue that the verbal ruling of the Court was 
inconsistent with the Findings, Conclusions and Decree later 
signed by the Court and that the Court has "abrogated" its 
responsibility. The issues concerning the interpretation of the 
Courtfs verbal ruling and the final written Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Quiet Title were fully heard by 
the Court on two occasions and the objections of the Appellants 
were considered and overruled. The Appellants cite Silliman v. 
Powell, 642, P.2d. 388, (Utah, 1982) to support their argument 
that the trial court's ruling should be rejected for ambiguity 
and uncertainty. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions are 
succeptible of only one interpretation. There exists no ambi-
guity or uncertainty. By Appellant's own admission the issues 
before the Court were complex. Notwithstanding the apparent 
discrepancy between the Court's verbal ruling and the written 
Findings and Conclusions, all the parties had opportunity to 
object. It is well established that the findings and judgment 
of the trial court in a quiet title action, will be presumed 
valid and will not be disturbed if there is substantial evidence 
in the record to support it. Ash v. State, supra. The Court 
expressly determined that its ruling was accurately represented 
by the Findings, Conclusion and Decree. 
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POINT IV 
THE APPELLANTS MAY NOT PREVAIL ON APPEAL INSOFAR 
AS THE DECREE IS CONSISTENT WITH AND IS NOT 
PREJUDICIAL TO THE APPELLANT'S INTERESTS. 
Each Appellant in this case was decreed property interests 
by the Court exceeding the original claims set forth in its com-
plaint, Sweeney Land Company was awarded more land than it 
originally claimed. However, the land was awarded to them in co-
tenancy with Maud Kimball. Apparently Sweeney Land Company 
objects to the award of the interest deeded to it by Melvin and 
Peggy Fletcher. The Findings of the Court were not, however, 
prejudicial to Sweeney Land Company in that they expressly 
awarded lands to the Sweeney Land Company in excess of those 
claimed by Sweeney Land Company in the easterly end of the 
30-foot strip. 
The Court affirmed Kimballs' interest in the parcel de-
scribed in the 1976 Quit Claim Deed, but Kimballs fail to 
recognize the co-tenancy interest created by the 1940 tax deed to 
Gilbert and Robert Kimball and fail to recognize the express 
findings of the Court that the co-tenancy created special obliga-
tions as between the co-tenants, and that actions taken by one 
co-tenant are considered to be actions on behalf of both co-
tenants. 
During the proceedings before the trial court, a sum equal 
to one-half of the property taxes paid by Gilbert and Maud 
Kimball from the time of the 1940 tax deed were deposited in 
Court by the Fletchers in recognition of the right a co-tenant 
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may have against another co-tenant for contribution toward the 
preservation of the co-tenancy estate. The ruling of the trial 
court finds that the funds on deposit are sufficient 
contribution, and therefore awards judgment to Maud Kimball for 
the funds on deposit with the Clerk of the Court. 
The ruling of the Court is particularly not prejudicial to 
the Kimballs in that the Court, in the written Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree, confirms the 1976 Quit-Claim deed 
executed by Gilbert Kimball. 
The Kimballs did not petition the Court for partition, nor 
did the Kimballs present any evidence to the Court of any other 
partition plan which would be more fair or equitable. It was the 
consistent position of the Kimballs throughout the trial, and it 
is again raised in this appeal, that the co-tenancy interest of 
Pobert Kimball was somehow extinguished by the actions of Gilbert 
and Maud Kimball, a contention the trial court dismissed. 
POINT V 
THE OTHER ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR RAISED 
BY APPELLANTS ARE WITHOUT MERIT. 
Appellants Kimball argue that Sweeney's and Fletcher's 
claims are barred by the Statute of Limitations. As discussed 
above, the Kimballs took no action which would either put the 
other parties on notice of their claims, or trigger the running 
of the statute of limitations (See Olwell v. Clark, supra). 
Similarly, Kimballs assert that Sweeney's and Fletchers' claims 
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are barred by Laches and Estoppel for failure to assert a 
"claim". Again, there was no action on the part of the Kimballs 
that should have precipitated a "claim" by the Fletchers or by 
Sweeney until recordation of the 1976 Quit Claim Deed. 
The Kimballs1 claim to adverse possession is without merit 
because, as forth above, the Court found no coincident possession 
and payment of property taxes in any of the parties for the 
requisite seven years. 
The Kimballs1 assertion that Fletcher's recordation of the 
"Notice of Probate Distribution" constitutes slander of title is 
groundless because the Notice affects only the interests of 
Robert Kimball in the property and not the 50% cotenancy of the 
Kimballs. 
The Kimballs1 argument that title to the Kimball interests 
is vested in the estate of Gilbert Kimball is in direct contra-
diction of the Courtfs finding that the 1976 Quit Claim Deed is a 
correction of the original 1940 tax deed. (Finding of Fact No. 
8), and is unsupported by the evidence. 
The Kimballs1 argument that the Court partitioned the 
property inequitably comes in the face of the fact that the 
Kimballs offered no alternative partition plan. 
Sweeney Land Company is barred by its Stipulation with the 
Fletchers from claiming any interest in the property adverse to 
that of the Fletchers. By Stipulation signed May 31, 1984 and 
approved by the Court. (R. 322-330), Sweeney Land company agreed 
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that all the claims of Sweeney "are resolved and settled" with 
the exchange of the properties mentioned therein (at R. 324) . 
Sweeney now claims ownership of the south half of the 30-foot 
strip, title to which was quieted in the Fletchers, in derogation 
of their Stipulation, and should be barred from so doing. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue of the payment of property taxes is non-issue. 
The trial court based its decision on title by deed and operation 
of law, not on title by adverse possession. Only the 1940 Tax 
Deed as amended by the 1976 Quit Claim Deed was found to consti-
tute a valid root of title. Sweeney's Quit Claim Deed was based 
on insufficient prior deeds, and therefor was neither sufficient 
itself, nor a "correction" of a prior valid conveyance, and was 
therefore a nullity. 
The Kimballs1 claims of extinguishment of Robert Kimball's 
interest, adverse possession and the running of the statute of 
limitations all failed for lack of supporting evidence. 
Based upon the evidence adduced and upon the law of property 
as it relates to quiet title actions, the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Quiet Title entered by the Court 
are proper and should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this l£fch day of November, 1986. 
KAPALPSKI, KINGHORN & PETERS 
GERALD/tt. KIN^ fTORN 
Attorn^jfr^r^ou'nterclaim-
Crossclaimants and Respondents, 
Melvin & Peacrv Plpfrhpr 
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I 
AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
GERALD H. KINGHORN, being duly sworn, says: 
That he is employed in the office of Kapaloski, 
Kinghron & Peters, attorneys for Counterclaim-crossclaimants and 
Respondents, Melvin and Peggy Fletcher• 
That he mailed four (4) true and accurate copies of 
Respondents1 Brief upon the parties to the within described 
action by placing a true and correct copy thereof in any envelope 
addressed to 
Robert Felton, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendants and Respondents, 
Gilbert Kimball and Maud Kimball 
5 Triad Center, Suite 585 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Paul D. Veasy 
Biele, Haslam & Hatch 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Sweeney Land Company 
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and by placing the same with the United-States Post Office, first 
class, postage prepaid, on the l^th #ay of November, 1986. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this lUth day of 
November, 19 86. 
My Commission Expires: 
lo/fr/97 
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